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We explore the role of domestic financial market frictions in explaining sharp movements in real and
nominal exchange rates, capital flows, and output for a small open economy.  Financial intermediaries
arise endogenously to insulate depositors from the consequences of liquidity shocks and stochastic
investment project returns, and to provide intermediation for efficient capital accumulation in the presence
of a costly state verification problem. An increase in the world interest rate may provoke an increase in the
fraction of credit-rationed entrepreneurs, a decrease in the steady state capital stock, and – when the
elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is low – a depreciation of the real exchange rate and an
outflow of capital.  Hence we can account qualitatively for the recent experience of several emerging
market economies in a model where all prices, including exchange rates, are perfectly flexible.
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After opening their markets to international trade in goods and assets, emerging economies have
experienced large and volatile capital °ows combined with substantial real exchange rate volatility.
In particular, episodes of real exchange rate appreciation, capital in°ows and increases in real
investment and output have been have been followed by periods of real depreciation, capital out°ows
and sharp reductions in real activity. Such reversals have often been accompanied by international
and domestic ¯nancial crises. This has led to calls for restrictions on international capital °ows,
as well as to proposals for improved monitoring and regulation of domestic banking systems. Such
policies, it is implied, couldpotentially stabilize international capital °ows, and help economies avoid
the ¯nancial crises that are followed by sudden sharp downturns in investment and output. Despite
such policy prescriptions, there have been very few attempts at formalizing the origins of swings
in capital °ows and real exchange rates. Much less have models addressed the interaction between
domestic ¯nancial institutions, international capital °ows and exchange rate behavior, which has
been argued to be at the root of the recent crises.
Our goal in this paper is to develop a theoretical model that explores the role of domestic ¯nancial
market frictions in explaining sharp movements in real and nominal exchange rates, capital °ows,
and output. To achieve this, we marry two models of banking and capital accumulation presented
earlier in the literature. The ¯rst, developed by Schreft and Smith (1997) and extended to an open
economy by Betts and Smith (1997), models banks as providers of insurance for agents who confront
individual uncertainty regarding future liquidity needs. In our economy, \workers" are subject
to individual liquidity shocks. These are represented by stochastic relocations of workers, both
domestically and to the rest of the world. Workers can transport only currency between locations,
1and inter-location exchange requires the currency of the location in which the seller resides.1 This
feature provides a liquidity motivation for holding ¯at moneys. In addition, it implies that only a
fraction of locally produced goods are traded, and trade requires cash in advance. The remainder
of goods are nontraded and consumed in their location of origin, where either cash or local credit
can be used as a means of payment. Hence the law of one price fails generically and the model
embodies a non-trivial theory of real exchange rate determination. Moreover, the possibility of
stochastic relocation, coupled with the role of currency in inter-location exchange, plays a role
similar to a \liquidity preference shock" in the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, and hence banks
arise endogenously to insure workers against their random, currency-speci¯c liquidity needs. In order
to provide this insurance, ¯nancial intermediaries hold reserves of both the foreign and domestic
currency, and in addition they invest in interest bearing assets. These consist of loans to domestic
\entrepreneurs", and a risk-free one-period asset which earns the world interest rate.
The second model of banking, introduced by Boyd and Smith (1997), focuses on the allocation
of credit for capital accumulation. In our economy, \entrepreneurs", need external ¯nancing to
invest in a capital production project which has an uncertain return and is subject to a costly state
veri¯cation (CSV) problem.2 This feature creates a role for ¯nancial intermediaries in eliminating
the duplication of monitoring costs that would otherwise be incurred by individual lenders. It also
allows for the existence of some unful¯lled demand for credit, and we will focus on equilibria in
which such credit-rationing obtains.
1 Along these dimensions, our model resembles Townsend (1987), Mitsui and Watanabe (1989), Hornstein and
Krusell (1993) and, most speci¯cally, Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996), Greenwood and Smith (1996), Schreft
and Smith (1997, 1998), Betts and Smith (1997) and Bhattacharya, Guzman, Huybens and Smith (1997).
2 The CSV problem we introduce is of the type considered by Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985),
Williamson (1986, 1987), and most speci¯cally, Boyd and Smith (1997, 1998), and Huybens and Smith (1998, 1999).
2Hence the ¯nancial intermediaries that we analyze undertake several functions that are identi¯ed
by authors such as McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) as being important for developing economies.
They insulate depositors from the consequences of liquidity shocks and stochastic investment project
returns, while providing intermediation for e±cient capital accumulation. In other words, the
frictions we consider render ¯nancial intermediation the e±cient arrangement for allocating both
liquidity and credit. This is an important aspect of our model because the discussion on adequate
regulation of the banking sector in emerging economies has called for measures to be taken both on
the liability and the asset side.
In this environment we obtain the following results. First, we describe technical conditions under
which there are at most two steady state equilibria with an excess demand for credit. One steady
state has a relatively low capital stock, while the other one has a relatively high level of capital. We
discuss the properties of equilibrium dynamics in a neighborhood of any steady state and illustrate
by example that only the low capital stock steady state can be approached. We then investigate how
in a long-run equilibrium, the capital stock, real exchange rate and net foreign holdings of domestic
assets are in°uenced by a change in the real world interest rate. We focus on the low-capital-stock
steady state since that is the attainable long-run equilibrium. We show how an increase in the
world interest rate always provokes an increase in the fraction of credit-rationed entrepreneurs, and
a decrease in the steady state capital stock for the low-capital-stock steady state. At the same time,
the e®ect of an increase in the world interest rate on the real exchange rate depends on the degree
of substitutability between labor and capital in production. When the elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital is low, we demonstrate by way of an example that an increase in the
world interest rate may provoke a depreciation of the real exchange rate in the low-capital-stock
steady state, as well as a reduction in the net foreign holdings of domestic assets.
3These results recall the recent experience of Mexico. Indeed, over the period 1987-1993, following
the liberalization of its external sector, Mexico experienced large capital in°ows, a rising capital
stock and level of output, and an appreciating real exchange rate. During 1994, world real and
nominal interest rates rose due to a tightening of monetary policy in the US and Europe. This is
commonly believed to have been only a minor factor leading to the reversal of capital °ows and the
¯nancial crisis that ensued. Here we demonstrate, in a model driven by ¯nancial market frictions,
that an increase in the world interest rate can account for a depreciated real exchange rate, a decline
in output and investment, and capital out°ows - phenomena that were all experienced by Mexico
during the 1994-1996 period. Furthermore, our economy displays aggravated credit rationing as
the world interest rate increases. This could, loosely speaking, be associated with the di±culties
experienced by the Mexican banking sector in 1995 and 1996.
Many commentators have argued that swings in capital °ows and real exchange rate levels occur
because countries peg their nominal exchange rate at a value which is \too high". When prices are
sticky, this results in an \overvalued" real exchange rate, and growing current account de¯cits. At
some point these de¯cits are considered \unsustainable" by foreign investors who rapidly withdraw
liquid investment funds. In contrast to this story, our paper provides an example of an economy in
which exchange rate misalignment and price rigidities are absent and yet the qualitative features of
the recent data for emerging economies can be accounted for. Our work might thus be viewed as part
of a very recent literature that does not rely on nominal rigidities or ¯xed exchange rates to explain
real exchange rate °uctuations and capital °ows for open economies. Examples of this literature
include Antinol¯ and Huybens (1998), Betts and Kehoe (1999), and Fernandez de Cordoba and
Kehoe (1999). Our paper di®ers from previous work in its emphasis on ¯nancial market frictions in
4explaining both the determination of output and the real exchange rate.3
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the environment, while
Section 3 discusses ¯nancial intermediation. Section 4 analyzes general equilibrium, focusing on the
existence of steady state equilibria, local dynamics, and comparative statics. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a small open economy in the tradition of Diamond's (1965) neoclassical growth model.
The economy is inhabited by an in¯nite sequence of two-period-lived overlapping generations and
an in¯nitely lived government. The economy produces a single ¯nal consumption good. The world
price of this good as well as the world interest rate, are taken as given by domestic agents.
2.1 Production
The consumption good is produced using a constant returns production technology with capital
and labor as inputs. Neither the good, nor the factors of production are mobile and we assume
that capital depreciates completely in production. Let Kt denote the date t capital input and Lt
the date t labor input of a representative ¯rm. Then its ¯nal output is F(Kt;Lt), where F is a






; with ¡1 < ¯ < 1. In addition, if




¯ denotes the intensive
3 The model presented in Antinol¯ and Huybens (1998) is most similar to ours. However, they consider an
informational friction in credit markets only. Hence their environment is not suited for evaluating policies directed to
banks' liability structure. Moreover, the mechanism they introduce for real exchange rate determination is di®erent
from ours.
5production function. Frequently, we will make use of the following properties of CES technology.
Lemma 1.
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Proof. The proof of Lemma 1 is straightforward.
2.2 Agents, Preferences and Endowments
There are two symmetric locations in the domestic economy, and at each date t a continuum of
young agents of measure unity is assigned to each location. Each generation is identical in size
and comprises two types of agent. A fraction ® of young agents in each location are risk neutral
\potential entrepreneurs" (potential borrowers), while the remaining fraction (1 ¡®) are risk averse
\workers" (lenders). An initial old generation with unit mass inhabits each location at date 0. All
agents are assumed to care only about old age consumption so that all young period income is
saved. In particular, we assume that generation t workers have the lifetime expected utility function
Ut = Etlnct+1 while generation t borrowers derive lifetime expected utility as Ut = Etct+1.
6All young agents are endowed with a single unit of labor which is supplied inelastically to
production, and they are retired when old. The initial old generation is endowed with the initial
capital stock K0 > 0, and holds the initial money stock of the economy, which we denote by
Ms
¡1 > 0. Finally, we assume that there is a given initial stock of net real international assets,
a¡1 = 0. Young agents are di®erentiated by their endowments of entrepreneurial ability as we now
describe.
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs
Only young potential entrepreneurs have access to a stochastic linear technology for converting date
t ¯nal goods into date t +1 capital. Thus all capital is produced by entrepreneurs.
The capital investment technology is indivisible: in particular, each potential entrepreneur is
endowed with one investment project which must be operated at scale q. When q > 0 units of the
¯nal good are invested at t; they yield zq units of capital at date t + 1, where z is an iid (across
entrepreneurs and periods) random variable which is realized at date t + 1. We let G denote the
probability distribution function of z, and assume that G has a di®erentiable density function g
with support [0; ¹ z]. Then ^ z ´
R ¹ z
0 zg(z)dz is the expected value of z.
While the distribution function of z is common knowledge, the actual amount of capital produced
by any project is private information and only the project owner can costlessly observe zt+1. Other
agents may verify the realized value of z on a project only by incurring a ¯xed cost of ° > 0 units
of capital.4
We impose two additional assumptions on the parameters of the investment technology.
4 In assuming that capital is used up in veri¯cation, we follow Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Boyd and Smith
(1997) and many others.





g0 ¸ 0; 8z 2 [0; ¹ z].
Assumption 2. q > ° g(0).
These assumptions will impose a simple structure on the expected return function of any lender
and thus greatly simplify our analysis.
2.2.2 Workers
While young workers have no access to the stochastic investment technology, they do confront
individual uncertainty regarding their future liquidity needs. Speci¯cally, all young workers in
each location face an exogenously given, ¯xed and known probability ² of being relocated to the
second location within the economy in which they were born. In addition, every young worker in
either domestic location faces a probability ²¤ of being relocated to the rest of the world, and a
probability (1 ¡ ² ¡ ²¤) > 0 of remaining in his initial location. Likewise, all agents in the rest of
the world confront a probability » of being relocated to the domestic economy. These probabilities
of relocation are iid across young workers and time periods.
Relocation shocks are realized at the end of date t, following the closure of all date t markets.
They therefore represent liquidity shocks. In particular, immediately following the realization of
the relocation shocks, young workers subject to relocation must move. We assume that relocated
workers can carry with them only currency for the purpose of purchasing goods in a new domestic
(foreign) location, and that all other assets have zero value in exchange for movers. Indeed, our
assumptions on the timing of trade and cross-location communication (described below) prevent
the veri¯cation and hence the redemption of interest bearing assets outside their location of issue.
Currency, on the other hand, is universally recognizable, non-counterfeitable and thus acceptable
in spatial exchange. In addition, we assume that all goods must be purchased in the currency of
8the seller. Thus, agents relocated to the second domestic location (to the rest of the world) must
take with them domestic (foreign) currency in order to achieve consumption when old.5
These assumptions provide a well-de¯ned motive for holding (multiple) currencies. Currency
provides liquidity in interlocation exchange, irrespective of its relative rate of return. As we describe
below, we will focus on equilibria in which currency is strictly dominated in rate of return by any
interest-earning asset. As a result, all young workers will have an incentive to diversify their asset
portfolios by holding both types of currency, as well as interest earning assets.
Finally, it bears emphasis that, despite the presence of individual uncertainty for all young agents,
there is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy.
2.3 Government Activity
The government prints ¯at currency to ¯nance an endogenously determined stream of ¯nal con-
sumption. Individuals derive no utility from this government consumption. We let gt denote per
capita government consumption of ¯nal goods at date t.
We assume that the government selects, for all time, a ¯xed rate of money growth which we




t¡1 = ¾ 8t ¸ 0, where Ms
t denotes the outstanding per capita stock of
currency at the end of date t. Let ms
t ´ Ms
t =pt denote the outstanding per capita real balances in
the economy, where pt denotes the domestic currency price of a unit of the ¯nal good at t. Then,








t¡1(pt¡1=pt) 8t ¸ 1: (1)
5 Hence, due to the presence of spatial seperation, some fraction of the purchases of the single good must be made
with cash. Consequently, an alternative interpretation of these assumptions is that, in the aggregate, there are some
cash goods and some credit goods.













8t ¸ 1: (2)
2.4 Trade
2.4.1 Factor and goods markets
At the beginning of a period, there is no communication across locations nor any movement of goods
or agents. Firms hire capital and labor in competitive factor markets, and factor market trade is
conducted autarkically in each location. Thus, capital and labor earn their marginal products.
Denoting by wt the date t real wage rate and by ½t the date t capital rental rate, we obtain
½t = f0(kt) (3)
wt = f(kt) ¡ktf0(kt) ´ w(kt): (4)
Once factor markets clear, production occurs and goods market trade takes place in each location.
Consumption of goods follows immediately.
2.4.2 Asset markets
Following consumption, domestic and international asset markets open. Now agents can communi-
cate without restriction across locations, and trade freely in all assets. The stores of value in the
economy are as follows.
Government issued domestic currency, as well as foreign currency may be held between periods.
Domestic currency obviously pays the gross real rate of return between dates t and t+1 of pt=pt+1,
measured in domestic goods. Letting p¤
t denote the foreign currency price of a good produced in
the rest of the world, we normalize p¤
t = 1. In addition, let et denote the domestic currency price
of a unit of foreign exchange. Then foreign currency held by a domestic agent between t and t+ 1
10earns the domestic real return (p¤
t=p¤
t+1)(et+1=et)(pt=pt+1) = (et+1=et)(pt=pt+1) ´ (xt+1=xt); where
xt ´ etp¤
t=pt = et=pt denotes the real exchange rate of the small open economy.
In addition, agents may hold interest-earning assets issued abroad. These assets are assumed to
be of one period maturity, default-risk free and earn the world gross real interest rate r¤ - measured
in foreign goods at date t +1 per unit invested at t. In domestic units, this return is r¤(xt+1=xt).
Finally, agents may hold domestically issued private debt by lending to domestic entrepreneurs.
The determination of the rate of return to those domestic loans is discussed below.
We will focus throughout the paper on equilibria in which net nominal interest rates are strictly
positive, so that both domestic and foreign currency is strictly dominated in rate of return (in a
common unit) by all interest-earning assets, whether they are domestically issued loans or risk-free
assets issued abroad.
Once asset markets close, all cross-location communication ceases, and relocation shocks are
realized. At this time, there is no opportunity for portfolio adjustments or liquidations of interest-
earning assets. Relocated agents - of which there are a measure (1¡®)(²+²¤) - move, taking with
them only the currency of the country of their ultimate location. All such movers would prefer -
were asset markets open or communication between locations feasible - to prematurely liquidate or
trade other assets held in their portfolio. However, in absence of such trading possibilities, young
workers are unable to insure themselves against liquidity shocks.
This timing of transactions and trade is depicted in Figure 1.
3 Financial Intermediaries
The economy that we have just described displays two sources of ine±ciencies motivating the emer-
gence of ¯nancial intermediaries that attract a positive measure of depositors and borrowers. First,
11the CSV problem provides a role for banks in the allocation of credit. Indeed, banks may pool
savings to provide loans for entrepreneurs. They can therefore avoid the duplication of veri¯cation
costs which would arise if savers engaged directly in lending to entrepreneurs. Second, banks may
insure young workers against the random liquidity shocks associated with stochastic relocation. We
now describe ¯nancial intermediaries which assume both these roles.
3.1 The Bank's Problem: Borrowers
Potential entrepreneurs have young period income wt, and we will only consider equilibria in which
they require external ¯nancing to run a project, i.e. for which q > w(kt): Clearly, a necessary
condition for such equilibria to exist is q > w(0): Hence we will maintain the following assumption.
Assumption 3. q > b
1
¯
2 for 0 < ¯ < 1; q > 0 for ¡1 < ¯ · 0:
We de¯ne lt = q¡w(kt) as the amount of a project that needs to be funded by borrowing. All such
borrowing is intermediated in the manner described by Williamson (1986). That is, intermediation
with respect to borrowers is motivated because it allows the economy to avoid the duplication of
veri¯cation costs which would arise if loans were held by individual lenders. Intermediaries behave
competitively with respect to the asset side of their balance sheets, taking as given the rates of
return to currencies, and risk-free assets issued abroad, and simply choosing whether to accept or
reject the loan contract terms o®ered by potential entrepreneurs who seek external funding for their
projects. In equilibrium, intermediaries will be perfectly diversi¯ed, and earn a nonstochastic return
on their lending portfolio.
It is well known that in the CSV environment, the optimal loan contract o®ered by potential
borrowers takes the form of a standard debt contract.6 In particular, a funded entrepreneur either
6 For a formal derivation of this contract, as well as the other results described in this section, see Boyd and Smith
12repays a non state-contingent gross loan interest rate vt or he defaults. In the latter case, the
intermediary monitors the project outcome, and retains all proceeds net of monitoring costs. When
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, the expected return to lending, ¼(vt); implied by these contracts is
a strictly concave function of the loan interest rate vt, which attains its maximum at ^ vt such as
depicted in Figure 2. For relatively low loan interest rates, expected returns rise as vt increases,
because the rise in gross repayments of principal plus interest, vtlt; outweighs the rise in costs due
to an increased number of bankruptcies. However, beyond ^ vt, a further increase in the loan interest
rate produces a decrease in the expected return to lending. Indeed, for loan interest rates higher
than ^ vt; the fraction of projects going bankrupt becomes so high, that the increased costs associated
with monitoring and with the fact that bankrupt ¯rms cannot fully repay principal plus interest,
dominate the increase in gross repayments which one would otherwise expect.
This environment is also characterized by the fact that unful¯lled demand for credit or \credit
rationing" may arise.7 When credit rationing obtains, all potential entrepreneurs o®er the loan
interest rate ^ vt that maximizes the expected returnfor a prospective lender. Unfunded entrepreneurs
cannot then alter loan contract terms in order to obtain credit since this would simply reduce the
expected return to any potential lender. Hence credit rationing may be an equilibrium outcome,8
and we henceforth focus on economies in which equilibrium credit rationing arises at all dates. This
seems justi¯ed given the prevalence of this feature in the credit markets of the emerging economies
that we intend this model to represent. When all potential entrepreneurs o®er the gross loan interest
(1997, 1998). For completeness, we have reproduced these derivations in a referee's Appendix.
7 Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986, 1987) ¯rst noted this feature of the CSV environment.
8 As we will discuss in Section 4, this will be true regardless of the fact that we will allow for unrestricted access
to international capital.
13rate ^ vt that maximizes a potential lender's expected return, the critical project return at which a
borrower's project income exactly covers loan principal plus interest is independent of the level of
the capital stock, and we denote it by ´. Thus, at all dates project veri¯cation occurs i® z 2 [0;´).
When credit is rationed, the expected return to lending at time t can be expressed as













Equivalently, the expected income to the intermediary from lending lt units at time t; is




Here the ¯rst term represents gross expected repayments of principal plus interest, ½t+1q´ = ^ vtlt,
while the last two terms represent the intermediary's costs due to bankruptcies. The second term
denotes expected monitoring costs, while the third term stands for expected losses due to bankrupt
¯rms' inability to fully repay principal plus interest.








; equation (5) implies that the expected return received
by a lender at t; rt, is equal to Ã(½t+1=lt) when credit is rationed. In other words, under credit
rationing, the expected return on funds loaned in private credit markets is proportional to the ratio
½t+1
lt , and hence depends only on the small open economy's capital stock at t and t+1.










De¯ning Á ´ ^ z¡
°
qG(´) > 0; the expected payo® of a funded entrepreneur can be written compactly
as Á½t+1q ¡ rtlt: Here the ¯rst term is expected project income, while the second term represents
expected loan repayments. For future reference we observe that the parameter Á represents the
14expected amount of capital produced per unit invested, net of monitoring costs, when credit is
rationed.
Since any potential entrepreneur always has the option of foregoing his project, saving his wage
income, and earning the return on deposits o®ered by banks or the world real interest rate on
directly held foreign assets, it is necessary to verify that potential borrowers will prefer to borrow,
rather than lend, in equilibrium. We denote the deposit return which banks o®er to entrepreneurs
by Rb
t. A borrower therefore prefers borrowing to lending under credit rationing i®






In Section 4 we will specify conditions under which (7) is satis¯ed. We henceforth analyze equilibria
in which credit is rationed and potential entrepreneurs prefer borrowing over lending. Hence all
potential entrepreneurs would prefer to run their investment projects, but only some of them will
actually receive the external funding needed to do so.
3.2 The Bank's Problem: Depositors
While banks are competitive on the asset side of their balance sheet, we assume that on the deposit
side they act as Nash competitors, announcing deposit contract terms and accepting all deposits
forthcoming at these terms. We now consider the behavior of banks which seek to obtain the
deposits of both workers and credit rationed entrepreneurs.
To attract the deposits of any credit rationed entrepreneurs, banks will o®er them at least the
world real interest rate, hence
Rb
t ¸ r¤(xt+1=xt): (8)
To attract the deposits of young workers, intermediaries will choose deposit returns dependent on
the relocation status of the agent, such as to maximize worker's expected utility, subject to a balance
15sheet constraint, a set of budget constraints, and subject to (8).
Thus, banks hold reserves of both domestic and foreign currency to meet early withdrawal
demand by movers, as well as interest-earning assets. The balance sheet constraint faced by a
representative bank is:
[(1¡ ®) +®(1 ¡ ¹t)]w(kt) = [1 ¡®¹t]w(kt) ¸ mt + m¤
txt + la
t +atxt: (9)
Here ¹t < 1 denotes the fraction of potential entrepreneurs that actually obtains credit, (1 ¡
®¹t)w(kt) is per capita deposits, mt denotes per capita domestic real balances held by a representa-
tive domestic bank, m¤
t denotes per capita foreign real balances held by a domestic bank, la
t ´ ®¹tlt
is per capita loans made to domestic entrepreneurs, and at denotes per capita net foreign assets
held by the bank.
The bank also faces four budget constraints. First, the bank knows that, at the end of date t,
²(1¡®) depositors will withdraw their deposits and require domestic currency to consume at t+1.
Each of these domestic movers deposit w(kt), and the bank guarantees them the gross real rate of
return Rm
t . Then, the bank's per capita holdings of domestic real balances must satisfy
(1 ¡®)²w(kt)Rm
t · mt(pt=pt+1): (10)





t is the gross real rate of return promised by a bank to a depositor relocated to the rest
of the world.
In addition, the bank confronts two types of potential depositors that do not move or require
currency in order to consume. Since we focus on equilibria in which currency is strictly dominated
16in rate of return by interest-earning assets, currency reserves are held exclusively for the purpose
of making payments to movers. Thus, against the deposits of all other agents, pro¯t maximizing
banks hold only interest-earning loans to domestic entrepreneurs and net foreign assets. For foreign






At the beginning of date t+1, (1 ¡²¡²¤)(1¡®) workers that have not been relocated contact
their local bank and withdraw their deposits. In addition, (1 ¡ ¹t)® credit rationed entrepreneurs
will withdraw deposits at this time. The budget constraint which a bank confronts with respect to
non-moving workers is therefore
(1 ¡² ¡²¤)(1 ¡®)w(kt)Rl
t · ±t(atxt +la
t)r¤(xt+1=xt) (13)
where Rl
t denotes the gross real rate of return the bank promises to such depositors and ±t · 1
denotes the fraction of the bank's interest-earning asset portfolio assigned to back the deposits of
these workers. Finally, the bank's budget constraint with respect to credit rationed entrepreneurs
is9
(1 ¡ ¹t)®w(kt)Rb
t · (1¡ ±t)(atxt + la
t)r¤(xt+1=xt): (14)
We now de¯ne ¸t ´ mt=[(1 ¡®¹t)w(kt)], and ¸¤
t ´ m¤
txt=[(1 ¡ ®¹t)w(kt)] as the portfolio
weights assigned to domestic and foreign currency respectively, expressed as a fraction of per capita
9 Unfunded entrepreneurs could conceivably hold foreign assets directly - since they do not face the probability of
relocation. Here we assume that all holdings of foreign assets in the domestic economy are intermediated. This is not
unrealistic: Corsetti et al. (1998) present evidence suggesting that a very large fraction of capital in°ows in emerging
economies is intermediated by domestic banks.
17deposits. Then 1 ¡ ¸t ¡ ¸¤
t ´ (atxt + la
t)=[(1 ¡ ®¹t)w(kt)] denotes the portfolio weight of interest-
earning assets.
























The problem of a bank which seeks to attract the deposits of workers and credit rationed en-
trepreneurs is, therefore, to
maxE(U) = ²ln[w(kt)Rm
t ] +²¤ln[w(kt)Rm¤
t ] + (1 ¡ ²¡ ²¤)ln[w(kt)Rl
t]
by choice of Rm
t , Rm¤
t , Rl
t, ¸t 2 (0;1), ¸¤
t 2 (0;1) and ±t 2 (0;1) subject to (15)-(18), and (8).
The solution to this problem satis¯es (15)-(18) with equality,
Rb
t = r¤(xt+1=xt); (19)
















(1¡ ®)(1 ¡ ²¡ ²¤)
(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡² ¡²¤)+ ®(1 ¡¹t)
: (23)
We now turn to a description of the general equilibrium of our economy.
184 General Equilibrium
In equilibrium, an international no arbitrage condition holds, the capital, labor, money and goods
markets clear, the government satis¯es its intertemporal budget constraint, and domestic capital
in°ows exactly o®set any net excess of domestic investment over domestic savings. We consider
only equilibria in which credit rationing obtains and for which entrepreneurs prefer borrowing over
lending. Finally, we focus exclusively on equilibria in which domestic and foreign currency are
strictly dominated in rate of return by all interest-bearing assets.
The international no arbitrage condition equates the real return on foreign assets to the return
on domestic investment projects, expressed in domestic units. Thus (12) must hold at all t ¸ 0,
and consequently, the domestic gross nominal interest rate on all interest-bearing assets is given
by It ´ r¤(xt+1=xt)(pt+1=pt) = r¤(et+1=et);while the foreign gross nominal interest rate is I¤ ´
r¤(p¤
t+1=p¤
t) = r¤. Then, in equilibria in which domestic and foreign currency are strictly dominated
in rate of return, r¤(xt+1=xt) > (pt=pt+1) ) r¤(et+1=et) ´ It > 1 and r¤(xt+1=xt) > (xt+1=xt) )





must be satis¯ed at all dates.
Equilibrium factor prices at t ¸ 0 are determined by (3) and (4). In addition, the date t + 1
supply of capital is given by the aggregate demand for investment goods at date t, ®¹tq; times the
expected yield of capital per unit invested, net of monitoring costs, Á. Then,
kt+1 = Á®¹tq 8t ¸ 0: (25)
At each date, the domestic money market clears. The per capita supply of real balances is ms
t:
These balances are held by domestic banks and by foreign agents relocating to the domestic country.
19Normalizing the population in the rest of the world as well as their per capita young period income to
1, the per capita foreign demand for domestic currency measured in domestic goods is »xt. The per






Thus, the domestic money market clearing condition takes the form
ms
t = ²(1 ¡®)w(kt) +»xt; 8t ¸ 0: (26)
At all dates t ¸ 1, the demand for domestic goods in any location includes the consumption of
all the old agents that reside in the domestic country at t. First, there are ²(1 ¡ ®) old domestic
workers who were relocated domestically and a fraction » old foreigners who were relocated from
abroad. Together these agents hold the entire per capita stock of date t¡1 domestic real balances,
which earn the gross real rate of return pt¡1=pt. In addition, there are (1 ¡ ² ¡ ²¤)(1 ¡ ®) old
workers and ®(1 ¡ ¹t¡1) credit rationed old entrepreneurs who consume the proceeds of their
intermediated holdings of assets, which earn the world real interest rate. Moreover, there are
®¹t¡1 old entrepreneurs who consume the return on their projects, which comprises their capital
rental income f0(kt)Áq less their repayments of debt to banks r¤(xt=xt¡1)[q ¡ w(kt¡1)]. Young
entrepreneurs invest goods of total per capita value ®¹tq = kt+1=Á. In addition, gt units of the ¯nal
good per capita are consumed by the government. The domestic goods market clearing condition
therefore takes the form
f(kt) = ms





+®¹tq +gt; 8t ¸ 1:
We use (25), and the fact that gt + ms
t¡1(pt¡1=pt) ´ gt + ms
t=¾ = ms
t - which follows from (2) - to
express this condition as








Finally, sources and uses of funds in the home country must be equal in equilibrium. In other
words,
w(kt) = (² +²¤)(1 ¡®)w(kt) +®¹tq +xtat: (29)
This condition is equivalent to the bank's balance sheet constraint, or to a balance of payments
condition.
Of course for entrepreneurs to be willing to borrow, we need to check that (7) is satis¯ed at all
dates. Given (19) and (12), that will clearly be the case when the following condition holds,
Á[q ¡w(kt)] ¸ Ã: (30)
Finally, equilibria need to satisfy ¹t < 1 8t, for credit to be rationed in all periods. Paren-
thetically, what accounts for the existence of credit rationing in a small open economy; one which
presumably can absorb large quantities of funds without disrupting world capital markets? The
answer is related to the CSV problem as re°ected in the no-arbitrage condition (12). At date t, the
domestic economy has an inherited capital stock of kt: Given this capital stock, the implied real wage
rate wt, and the equilibrium sequence of real exchange rates, xt, domestic entrepreneurs must o®er
intermediaries an expected return equal to the world rate of interest. The highest expected return
they can o®er is Ãf0(kt+1)=[q ¡ w(kt)]; at t this is obviously determined by kt+1. Hence equation
(12) implies that world capital markets fund the largest quantity of domestic capital investment
that is consistent with domestic borrowers being able to o®er the required market rate of return.
Any further capital investments would lower the marginal product of capital such that domestic
borrowers could no longer compete in world markets. This is the source of credit rationing in the
domestic economy.
214.1 The Initial Period
In the initial period, the domestic goods market equilibrium condition, and the government budget
constraint, take a di®erent form than at any other date. At t = 0, the predetermined supply of
goods is f(k0) per capita. The demand for goods derives from old agents who earn the rental rate
on their holdings of capital, f0(k0)k0, and the value of initial real balances, Ms
¡1=p0. In addition,
young entrepreneurs invest wage income in capital projects, where gross investment at t = 0 is





+ f0(k0)k0 +®¹0q +g0 (31)




p0 : We can then rewrite the









Hence, givenaninitial domestic price level, p0, the initial per capita capital stock, k0, andthe date
zero nominal money supply Ms
0 = ¾Ms
¡1, date 0 real balances are immediately determined while the





is given. Inaddition, x0 ´ e0=p0 and hence e0 follows from the money market clearing condition(26),
while government consumption is read from the government's date 0 budget constraint. The date 0
net foreign asset position can be derived from the balance of payment condition (29). Finally, x1 is
determined by the no-arbitrage condition (12), p1 by the date 1 money market clearing condition,
and k2 by date 1 goods market clearing (28).
The entire equilibrium sequence of future real money balances, prices, interest rates, capital
stocks, real exchange rates, net holdings of foreign assets and values of ¹t can thus be determined
givenaninitial domestic price level, p0. However, the value of p0 is not determinedby the equilibrium
22conditions and is thus a free initial condition. The properties of dynamic equilibrium paths are
analyzed below. We ¯rst turn our attention to stationary equilibria.
4.2 Steady State Equilibria





must hold and this pins down the steady state capital stock. From goods market clearing, the











Steady state real balances are then given by
ms = (1 ¡ ®)²w(k) + »x: (35)






















Clearly, for any solution to (33)-(38) to constitute an equilibrium steady state requires that a
number of restrictions are satis¯ed. These are presented in the following De¯nition.
De¯nition 1. A pair of stationary values (k;x) is a steady state equilibrium if
23a) k solves the no arbitrage condition (33) and the pair (k;x) solves the goods market clearing condi-
tion (34); b) k 2 (0;1); c) x 2 (0;1); d) borrowers prefer borrowing to lending or Á[q ¡w(k)] ¸ Ã
is satis¯ed; e) credit rationing obtains or ¹ < 1; f) currencies are return dominated or (24) holds.
We now develop su±cient conditions for the existence of a steady state equilibrium. We collect
these conditions in Proposition 3. We start by de¯ning H(k) ´ Ãf0(k)=[q ¡ w(k)]. Then
r¤ = H(k) (39)
is an alternative representation of (33). Clearly the function H(k) plays a key role in determining
long run equilibria. We now establish some of its properties.
Lemma 2. The function H(k) satis¯es





1 i® ¡1 < ¯ < 0;
b) limk!^ kH(k) = 1 where ^ k ´ w¡1(q) and 1 > w¡1(q) > 0
c) H0(k) > (·)0 as k > (·)f¡1(q).
Proof. Part a) of the Lemma is immediate from Lemma 1. Part b) is also obvious. Part c) follows
straightforwardly from di®erentiation of H(k), which yields H0(k) = ¡Ãf00(k)
[f(k)¡q]
[q¡w(k)]2.
Lemma 2 implies that H(k) has the con¯guration depicted in Figures 3 and 4, and Proposition
1 follows immediately.
Proposition 1. Suppose that H[f¡1(q)] < r¤ < limk!0H(k). Then there are exactly two values of
k 2(0;1) that satisfy (39), which we denote by k1 and k2; where k2 > k1.
Hence if the world interest rate satis¯es the conditions spelled out in Proposition 1, there are exactly
24two candidate steady state capital stocks, k1 and k2; for which credit is rationed. Each of these is
associated with a distinct stationary real exchange rate - which we denote by xi, i = 1;2 - where xi
is determined by (34). Given ki and xi, the associated values of ¹i, ms
i; gi, and ai, i = 1;2, follow
immediately.
We now establish conditions under which both candidate steady state equilibrium capital stocks
also satisfy 0 < xi < 1.
First, we de¯ne
¡(r¤) ´ 1¡ (1 ¡ ®)²¡ [1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(² +²¤)]r¤; (40)
¦(r¤) ´
Á¡(r¤)




[1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(² +²¤)]
: (42)
It is then easy to prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. Let ¡(r¤); ¦(r¤) and ^ r¤ be given by (40), (41), and (42), respectively. Then,
a) ¡0(r¤) = ¡[1 ¡(1 ¡®)(²+ ²¤)] < 0 and ¡(r¤) < 0 iff r¤ > ^ r¤;





> 0 and ¦(r¤) < 0 iff r¤ 2 (1;^ r¤).
We are now ready to state the following proposition which is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4.
Proposition 2. If r¤ 2 (1; ^ r¤) then the real exchange rates xi associated with the solutions ki to
(39) satisfy 0 < xi < 1:
Proof. Equation (34) implies that 0 < xi < 1 i® -(ki) ´ ki
w(ki) > ¦(r¤): But from Lemma 3, we
25know that ¦(r¤) < 0 for r¤ 2 (1;^ r¤): Hence r¤ 2 (1;^ r¤) is a su±cient condition for 0 < xi < 1.
We now develop a set of conditions on r¤ that are su±cient to guarantee the existence of exactly
two solutions to (39), both of which satisfy all the conditions for a steady state equilibrium listed
in De¯nition 1.
Proposition 3. Suppose that min
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;H [Á®q];limk!0H(k); ^ r¤ª´
. Then there
exist two steady state equilibria for which credit is rationed.
Proof. For there to exist exactly two solutions to (39) requires that H[f¡1(q)] < r¤ < limk!0H(k).
We also know that a necessary and su±cient condition for credit rationing to arise at any stationary
capital stock k is ¹ < 1, or equivalently from (36), k < Á®q. Hence Á®q > f¡1(q) is necessary for
the two solutions to (39) to exhibit credit rationing, while r¤ <H [Á®q] is su±cient for credit to be
rationed in both solutions. In addition, from (30), we know that Á[q ¡ w(k)] > Ã, or equivalently
k < w¡1(q ¡Ã=Á); is necessary and su±cient for potential borrowers to have an incentive to bor-
row rather than lend. Hence w¡1(q ¡ Ã=Á) > f¡1(q) is necessary for the two solutions to (39) to




is su±cient for entrepreneurs
in both solutions to prefer borrowing over lending. For both solutions to (39) to be associated with





is necessary for both currencies to be return dominated in steady state. Indeed, in a steady state
equilibrium, the in°ation rate is given by pt+1=pt = (mt=mt+1)(Mt+1=Mt) = (Mt+1=Mt) = ¾, and
the domestic nominal interest rate is I = r¤(xt+1=xt)(pt+1=pt) = r¤¾; while the foreign nominal rate
26remains I¤ = r¤. Then, any steady state equilibrium in which both currencies are return dominated
and (24) holds must satisfy I > 1, and I¤ > 1, or r¤ > max(1;1=¾):
The ¯nancial market frictions that we have introduced in this economy clearly play a major role
in the determination of long run equilibrium. Indeed, due to the CSV problem in credit markets,
our economy potentially displays two steady states in which credit is rationed. The parameter Ã;
which embodies the ¯xed cost of veri¯cation °; determines the severity of credit rationing and hence
the steady state level of the capital stock. Moreover, the steady state real exchange rate depends
crucially on the liquidity shocks, ² and ²¤. In particular, the greater the fraction of workers who
are subject to cash in advance constraints, the more depreciated is the real exchange rate. Indeed,
for a given level of the capital stock and world real interest rate, the domestic consumption of non-
relocated agents declines for higher levels of ² and ²¤; and this will be o®set by a depreciation of the
real exchange rate, which raises the purchasing power of foreign agents relocated to the domestic
economy.
To conclude this section, we provide an example of an economy that satis¯es all the conditions
listed in Proposition 3, and hence displays two long run equilibria.
Example 1. Let f(k) =
£
0:8 k¡0:1 +0:35
¤¡10 ; and assume that q = 1:05, g(z) = 1=¹ z with ¹ z =
20:67, and ° = 10:55; which implies that Á = 15:5 and Ã = 8:6. Assume further that » = 1;
® = 0:9, ² = 0:45, ²¤ = 0:45; ¾ = 1:01 and r¤ = 1:015. For these parameter values, Á®q = 14:65;






w¡1 (q ¡ Ã=Á)
¤
= 1:043;
H [Á®q] = 1:078; limk!0H(k) = 76, and ^ r¤ = 1:049: Hence Proposition 3 applies, and two steady
state equilibria exist. Their values are, k1 = 6:39;
k1f0( k1)
f( k1) = 0:65; x1 = 0:015; a1 = ¡9:1; and
27k2 = 11:11;
k2f0( k2)
f( k2) = 0:64; x2 = 0:025; a2 = ¡12:73.
It is worth noting that the shares of GDP earned by capital in our example are high by the standards
of developed economies, but quite realistic for emerging economies.
4.3 Local Dynamics
We now analyze the properties of dynamical equilibria to determine which steady state(s) can be
attained. We use (12) and (28) to reduce the system of general equilibrium conditions to two second




























To simplify matters, we transform these two second order equations into a system of three ¯rst
order di®erence equations.
Let yt = kt+1. Then, we can express (43)-(44) as




























We then linearize this system in the neighborhood of any steady state equilibrium (k;x;y) as
(kt+1 ¡k;xt+1 ¡ x;yt+1 ¡ y) = J (kt ¡ k;xt ¡x;yt ¡y)
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r¤ ¡ [(1 ¡®)(1 ¡² ¡²¤) + ®]w(k)
¾
The characteristic equation for J takes the form
























While it is di±cult to provide a general characterization of the local stability properties of steady
state equilibria, we have calculated a series of numerical examples. For each of these, the low-capital-
stock steady state is locally a saddle point with two positive eigenvalues smaller than one, while
the high-capital-stock steady state is locally a saddle point with one eigenvalue smaller than 1 in
absolute value. Given that our system has two predetermined state variables, only the low-capital-
stock steady state can be approached for all these examples, and the equilibrium path leading to
the low-capital-stock steady state is unique.
29We proceed to present a numerical example which illustrates these stability properties. We use
the same parameters as in our earlier Example 1.
Example 2.
At k1; ¸1 = 0:38; ¸2 = 0:93; and ¸3 = 1:08;
At k2; ¸1 = 0:15; and mod(¸2) = mod(¸3) = 1:05:
For this example, the equilibrium path towards the low capital stock steady state is monotonic in
the neighborhood of the steady state since the stable roots for k1 are real and positive.
4.4 Comparative Statics
We now discuss the consequences of changes in the world real interest rate for the steady state
equilibrium capital stocks and real exchange rates. We focus on the e®ects for the low-capital-stock
steady state, since our analysis of dynamic properties indicates that is the only attainable steady
state.
From Figures 5 and 6, it is evident that an increase in r¤ raises the high-activity steady state
capital stock, k2, while it lowers the low activity steady state capital stock, k1. We summarize this
result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.
a) dk




dr¤ jk1= ¡1; limr¤!H[f¡1(q)]
dk
dr¤ jk2= +1:
Proof. Note that (39) implies that dr¤ = H0 (k)dk, and thus dk
dr¤ = 1
H0(k): The results then follow
30from Lemma 2, taking into account that k1 < f¡1(q) < k2.
The intuition underlying these e®ects is the following. An increase in r¤ must be met by an
increase in the steady state equilibrium value of the real return to lending. In the low-capital-stock
steady state it is the behavior of the marginal product of capital, f0(k), that determines how the
real return to lending varies. Hence an increase in the real interest rate requires a corresponding
increase in the rental rate of capital, and thus a decrease in the capital stock. In the high-capital-
stock steady state, adjustments in the amount of internal ¯nance, w(k), govern the behavior of the
real return to lending, so the level of internal ¯nance must increase to raise the return to lending.
This requires a corresponding increase in the real wage, which is associated with an increase in the
steady state level of the capital stock.
The impact of an increase in r¤ on the steady state equilibrium real exchange rate is ambiguous,
and depends critically on the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in production.































It is then straightforward to prove the Lemma 4.
Lemma 4.
a) Let @x
@r¤ be given by (50), then @x
@r¤ >0 iff -(k) > ¡Á¡0(r¤);
31b) Let @x
@k be given by (51), then @x
@k >0 if r¤ 2 (1;^ r¤);
Proof. Part a) is obvious from the de¯nition of @x





[r¤¡1] ´¦(r¤): The result then follows from Lemma 3.
From equations (49)-(51), Proposition 4 and Lemma 4 it is clear that the e®ect of an increase
in the world interest rate on the real exchange rate is ambiguous and may cause an appreciation
or a depreciation of the real exchange rate in either steady state equilibrium. The ambiguity of
the e®ect of an increase in the world interest rate can best be explained by referring to the goods
market condition (27). Clearly, abstracting from its e®ect on the capital stock, a rise in r¤ implies
an increase in the steady state income of domestic non-relocated depositors, but an increase in loan
repayments and hence a decrease in steady state income for domestic entrepreneurs. The net e®ect
of these two forces depends critically on the value of the capital stock k; relative to the value of
the wage income w(k). When k is high relative to w(k), which implies that -(k) is high, then
the decrease in the income of domestic borrowers outweighs the increase in the income of domestic
depositors, and the ensuing loss in domestic consumption will be o®set by a depreciation of the real
exchange rate which increases the purchasing power of foreign agents, hence @x
@r¤ > 0. On the other
hand, when k is low relative to w(k), which implies that -(k) is low, then the reverse obtains, and
the increase in domestic consumption will be o®set by an appreciation of the real exchange rate
which reduces the purchasing power of foreign agents, hence @x
@r¤ < 0: Thus, the e®ect of an increase
in the world interest rate on the real exchange rate depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution
between labor and capital in production, as is re°ected in Figures 5 and 6. As is obvious from these
¯gures, a depreciation of the real exchange rate in the low capital stock steady state induced by
an increase in the world interest rate, is much more likely to occur in the case where production
32exhibits relatively low substitutability between capital and labor (¯ < 0).
So far we have abstracted from the e®ect of a rise in the world interest rate on the steady state
capital stock. However, this e®ect also directly a®ects the goods market and hence the equilibrium
real exchange rate. When k falls, which is the case for the low-capital-stock steady state, the number
of domestic depositors increases, but their income decreases. On the other hand, the number of
domestic lenders decreases, their rental income from capital increases but their loan repayments
increase as well. As long as r¤ 2 (1;^ r¤) this induces a decrease in domestic consumption which is
compensated for by an appreciation of the real exchange rate which raises the purchasing power of
foreigners, that is @x
@k
dk
dr¤ < 0. When k increases, which is the case for the high-capital-stock steady




All in all, the e®ect of an increase in the world interest rate is complex and only under very
speci¯c conditions can we state unambiguous results, which we collect in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Assume the conditions stated in Proposition 3 hold. Then,
a) limr¤!H[f¡1(q)]
dx
dr¤ jk1= ¡1; limr¤!H[f¡1(q)]
dx
dr¤ jk2= +1;




> ¡Á¡0(r¤); then dx
dr¤ jk2> 0;
Proof. Part a) is obvious from equation (49) and Proposition 4: For part b) notice from Lemma




> ¡Á¡0(r¤), then -(k2) > ¡Á¡0(r¤) as well
since k2 > f¡1(q): Consequently, from Lemma 4 a) we know that @x
@r¤ jk2> 0: Moreover, if the
conditions of Proposition 3 are satis¯ed then r¤ 2 (1;^ r¤), thus Lemma 4 b) applies and @x
@k jk2>0 as
well. Finally from Proposition 4 we know dk
dr¤ jk2> 0 always holds. Hence, all the terms in (49) are
positive and thus dx
dr¤ jk2> 0:
33We conclude this section with two examples that illustrate our comparative statics results. First,
we present an example for which the parameter values are the same as in Example 1. In particular,
¯ = ¡0:1 < 0; and the substitutability between labor and capital in production is relatively low.
We report only the values for the low-capital-stock steady state since that is the only long-run
equilibrium that can be approached.
Example 3.
a) For r¤ = 1:015, ¹1 = 0:44; k1 = 6:39; x1 = 0:01556; and a1 = ¡9:1.
b) For r¤ = 1:020, ¹1 = 0:42; k1 = 6:08; x1 = 0:01558; and a1 = ¡8:4:
c) For r¤ = 1:025, ¹1 = 0:40; k1 = 5:82; x1 = 0:01561; and a1 = ¡7:8:
d) For r¤ = 1:030, ¹1 = 0:38; k1 = 5:59; x1 = 0:01562; and a1 = ¡7:3:
Clearly, for this example, as the world interest rate increases, the fraction of potential entrepreneurs
awarded credit decreases in the low-capital-stock steady state, hence the capital stock decreases.
At the same time, the real exchange rate depreciates, and net foreign holdings of domestic assets
decrease. These results recall the recent experience of Mexico. Indeed, over the period 1987-1993,
following the liberalization of its external sector, Mexico had experienced large capital in°ows, a
rising capital stock and level of output, and an appreciating real exchange rate. During 1994, world
real and nominal interest rates rose due to a tightening of monetary policy in the US and Europe.
This is commonly believed to have been only a minor factor leading to the reversal of capital in°ows
and the ¯nancial crisis that ensued. Here we demonstrate, in a model driven by ¯nancial market
frictions, that an increase in the world interest rate can account for a depreciated real exchange rate,
a decline in output and investment, and capital out°ows - phenomena that were all experienced
by Mexico during the 1994-1996 period. Furthermore, our economy displays aggravated credit
34rationing as the world interest rate increases. This could, loosely speaking, be associated with the
di±culties experienced by the Mexican banking sector in 1995 and 1996. It is worth underlining
that we obtain these results despite the fact that all prices, including the nominal exchange rate,
are perfectly °exible.
We now present a contrasting example for an economy with relatively high substitutability
between labor and capital in production (¯ = 0:1):
Example 4. Let f(k) =
£
0:8 k0:1 +0:35
¤10; and assume that q = 1:05, g(z) = 1=¹ z with ¹ z = 20:56,
and ° = 20:22; which implies that Á = 11:5 and Ã = 0:13. Assume further that » = 1; ® = 0:9,
² = 0:45, ²¤ = 0:45; and ¾ = 1:01.
a) For r¤ = 1:015, ¹1 = 0:0065; k1 = 0:070; x1 = 0:0079; and a1 = 28.
b) For r¤ = 1:020, ¹1 = 0:0062; k1 = 0:068; x1 = 0:0067; and a1 = 32:
c) For r¤ = 1:025, ¹1 = 0:0061; k1 = 0:066; x1 = 0:0055; and a1 = 39:
d) For r¤ = 1:030, ¹1 = 0:0059; k1 = 0:064; x1 = 0:0044; and a1 = 48:
For this example, as the world interest rate increases, the fraction of potential entrepreneurs awarded
credit decreases in the low-capital-stock steady state, hence the capital stock decreases, while net
foreign holdings of domestic assets decrease. However, for this example, these phenomena are
accompanied by an appreciating real exchange rate.
5 Conclusion
We have examined a simple model of a small open economy in which goods market frictions al-
low for permanent deviations from the law of one price, and in which ¯nancial market frictions
render ¯nancial intermediation the e±cient arrangement for allocating both credit and liquidity.
35Entrepreneurs face a CSV problem in investment projects, which creates a role for banks in e±cient
capital production. Workers face the possibility of stochastic relation in which only currency can
be redeemed, hence banks also insure lenders against random liquidity needs.
We have used this economy to analyze how the operation of ¯nancial markets impacts on capital
accumulation and exchange rate behavior. We have described conditions under which there are at
most two steady states in this economy (in which credit is rationed). One has a low capital stock,
a low level of internal project ¯nance, and hence a relatively severe CSV problem. The other has a
high capital stock, a high level of internal ¯nance contributed by entrepreneurs, and thus a relatively
mild CSV problem. However, we have also established by example that only the low capital stock
steady state can be approached in this economy.
We then study the e®ect of an increase in the world interest rate, and focus on the low-capital-
stock steady state. In this steady state, an increase in the world interest rate produces a decrease
in the capital stock and output, while the e®ect on the real exchange rate depends on the elasticity
of substitution between labor and capital in production. When that elasticity is relatively low,
an increase in the world interest rate may induce a depreciation of the real exchange rate and a
reduction in the net holdings of domestic assets by foreigners. These results are reminiscent of the
recent experience of emerging economies. Moreover, it is worth underlining that we obtain these
results in a model where all prices, including the nominal exchange rate, are perfectly °exible.
Clearly, our set-up can be used to examine the e®ect of several policy interventions on investment
and capital accumulation. Obvious candidates are exchange rate policy, restrictions on international
capital °ows, and measures with respect to the domestic banking sector, such as the introduction of
reserve requirements on domestic and foreign currency. Of particular interest is the question as to
whether any of these policies can change the stability properties of the long-run equilibria and can
36induce the high-capital-stock steady state to be approachable. We could also verify whether any
of these interventions can restore the potency of monetary policy in this economy. Indeed, in the
framework we discussed, domestic monetary policy is entirely impotent: neither the determination
of long-run equilibria nor the stability properties of these equilibria depend on the rate at which
the domestic economy issues currency. Finally, after the introduction of aggregate randomness,
our economy could be used to evaluate the e®ect of a deposit insurance scheme on investment and
output. We leave all these topics for future research.
37REFEREE'S APPENDIX
Following Williamson (1986, 1987), a loan contract consists of three objects. First, there is
a speci¯ed set of project return realizations, At, for which veri¯cation (monitoring) of the project
return occurs at date t. Veri¯cation of project returns does not occur if z 2 Bt ´ [0; ¹ z]¡At. Second,
if z 2 At, then the contractual debt repayment can be made contingent on z in a meaningful way,
and we denote the real value of such a payment by Rt(z). Finally, if z 2 Bt, then no such state
contingency is possible for debt repayment terms, and the only incentive compatible contract o®ers
a non-conditional real payment of vt per unit borrowed. Announced contracts are either accepted
or rejected by intermediaries. If accepted, the intermediary commits to monitoring project returns
whenever an entrepreneur reports z 2 At.
Intermediaries make loans, taking as given the expected gross market return on loans between t




[Rt(z)lt ¡½t+1°]g(z)dz + vtlt
Z
Bt
g(z)dz ¸ rtlt: (52)
Note that the expected monitoring cost, in units of date t goods, depends on the marginal product
of capital, ½t+1, since ° units of capital are expended at t +1 when project returns are veri¯ed.
In addition, since only project owners observe project returns directly, an equilibrium contract
must have the feature that it is consistent with the incentive for entrepreneurs to correctly reveal
when a monitoring state has occurred. The appropriate incentive constraint is:
Rt(z) · vt; z 2 At: (53)
Finally, the repayments speci¯ed in a contract must be feasible for a borrower so that they never











Announced loan contract terms at date t are therefore selected to maximize the expected utility









The solution to the entrepreneur's problem is to o®er a standard debt contract (modi¯ed for the
presence of internal ¯nance). In particular, the borrower either repays vtlt (principal plus interest)
or defaults. In the latter case, the lender monitors the project and retains the proceeds net of
monitoring costs. Formally,






















g(z)dz = rt: (58)
The proof of Proposition 6 is standard and we omit it here.10
We can derive a simple expression for the expected return to a ¯nancial intermediary by substi-
tuting (56) and (57) into (58) to obtain





























































Assumption 1 implies that ¼11 < 0. Then if both Assumption 1 and 2 hold, ¼ has the con¯gu-
ration depicted in Figure 2. Therefore, given lt
½t+1, there is a unique value of vt that maximizes the





, where the function



















































g(´)¡G(´) ´ 0. When all potential
entrepreneurs o®er the gross interest rate ^ v that maximizes a potential lender's expected return, ´
is the critical project return at which a borrower's project income exactly covers loan principal plus
interest. Thus, project veri¯cation occurs i® z 2 [0;´).
A feature of the environment that we have just described is that it may be characterized by credit





must hold, which implies that all potential entrepreneurs
o®er contracts that maximize the expected return for a prospective lender. Unfunded entrepreneurs
cannot then alter loan contract terms in order to obtain credit since this would simply reduce the
expected return to any potential lender and credit rationing may be an equilibrium outcome.























































the last line of which is equation (5).
We can derive also the expected income (utility) for a potential borrower under credit rationing
as


















which is equation (6).
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